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performance: An empirical evidence of the dairy sector 
 
Abstract 
Purpose- The purpose of this study is to analyze the influence of chain governance on chain 
performance among the chain members.  
Design/methodology/approach- The survey was conducted in a triadic context with 345 
chain members (115 dairy farmers, 115 dairy cooperative managers and 115 processors) of 
the dairy sector in Uganda. Data collection was performed through simple random sampling 
by survey questionnaires with the chain executives. SEM was used for data analysis. 
Findings- The results revealed several chain governance structures (spot market, relational, 
contractual and mini integration) some confirmed the hypothesized correlations on chain 
performance at different chain levels. We found a positive influence of relational governance 
on chain performance for all the chain members, however, the effect is stronger at the first 
supplier chain level.   
Originality/value- This triadic chain approach makes an original contribution to the chain 
governance structures and chain performance literature. Studies analyzing all aspects of CGS 
and CP at three tire chain level are limited.    
Keywords: Chain governance structure, chain performance, Triad, Dairy sector  
Paper type: Research paper  
 
1. Introduction 
The literature on chain governance structures has received significant attention, this topic has 
been widely studied considering the analysis of inter-organizational relationships as a multi-
dimensional phenomenon, which is embedded in the supplier-buyer relationships and 
processes (Dolci et al., 2017). Over the last two decades, the concept of governance has also 
been applied to the supply chain area (Cai et al., 2011, Claro et al., 2003, Zhang and 
Aramyan, 2009, Ferguson et al., 2005, Mesic et al., 2018, Huang and Huang, 2018). In these 
studies, it has been either referred to as supply chain governance or relationship quality. In 
this paper, the governance structure is defined as the institutional arrangements within which 
transactions are negotiated and executed (Williamson, 1991). The term chain governance 
structures focus on adopting an uncertain environment to enhance performance Therefore, the 
evaluation of effectiveness and efficiency of chain governance structures involves using 
metrics related to various performance objectives such as cost, responsiveness, flexibility, 
and quality (Zhang and Aramyan, 2009). In contrast to chain performance, we propose that 
chain governance is concerned with the balance between long-term relational decisions and 
interdependency that exists among supplier-buyer relationships (Richey Jr et al., 2010). 
 
In addition, chain governance elements are presented with a different classification in the 
extant literature (Kataike and Gellynck, 2018). For example, a contract is classified as a 
mechanism (Yu et al., 2006) and as a structure (Raynaud et al. (2005), while incentive is 
defined as a mechanism (Wathne and Heide, 2004, Kashyap et al., 2012). The same applies to 
relational governance, where proxies have been used, such as trust (Poppo et al., 2015, Chen 
et al., 2013), informal ties (Stouthuysen et al., 2017), social control (Osmonbekov et al., 
2016), and cooperation or solidarity (Fałkowski et al., 2017). The previous literature also 
shows that there are several dimensions of governance, but none has defined this concept 
precisely as distinguishable multiple components and elements (Wacker et al., 2016, Dolci et 
al., 2017, Chen et al., 2017). Therefore, the contributions of several studies are isolated, and 
proxy constructs have been used when considering necessary elements of chain governance 
structures, which can improve chain performance (Chen et al., 2004). 
 
Notably, researchers have used different governance structures ranging within a continuum 
from market (‘buy’) to vertical integration (‘make’) to explain coordination in food chains 
(Gellynck and Molnár, 2009, Raynaud et al., 2005, Schulze et al., 2007, Wever et al., 2010).  
In particular, Gellynck and Molnár (2009), depicted product, chain level and country-specific 
characteristics of governance structures GSs used in European food chains. Wever (2012) 
proposed a framework that includes price, volume, quality, and investments to assess 
governance structures. Raynaud et al. (2005) use six types of governance structures following 
a hierarchical sequence namely; spot market, relational contract, relational contract with an 
approved partner, formal written contract, equity-based contract, and vertical integration to 
analyze their alignment between quality. Schulze et al. (2007) present a typology of 
governance structures used in pork chains: spot market, long-term, relationships, marketing 
contracts, production contracts, farming contracts, and vertical integration. 
 
Despite the vastness of research dealing with chain governance and chain performance, most 
of the literature has paid little attention to the complexity of governance structures that 
underlie chain performance in triadic agri-food chains. Therefore, the contribution of this 
paper is quadruple. First, most of the literature deal with either the governance part or the 
performance part overlooking the correlation between the two concepts. For example, the 
study by Gellynck and Molnár (2009) focused on the determinant factors of the chain 
governance structure in the European food sector without a link to chain performance. 
 
Second, the exception who discuss the links between chain governance structure and chain 
performance lack completeness particularly in governance structure constructs and the level 
of chain analysis. Instead of using various alternative forms of governance structures they 
limit their investigation on only one or two. Examples of such studies include; Birthal et al. 
(2017),  who examined contractual and relational governance and their association with 
profitability and efficiency. Similarly, Poppo et al. (2015) discussed the impact of contracts 
and trust on supplier performance. Abdi and Aulakh (2017) carried out an explorative study 
that addressed the relational and contractual governance in relation to mutual relationship 
strengthening. Han et al. (2011) attempted to explore the association between transaction 
costs on spot market, contractual and relational and quality management of the pork 
processors. Panayides and Lun (2009) analyzed the influence of trust on the innovativeness 
aspect of chain performance and found that there are positive effects of trust on the 
innovativeness of the supply chains.  
 
Third, some studies on chain governance and chain performance focused on conceptual 
framework developments and systematic reviews which need to be supported with empirical 
evidence. For instance, studies reported by Zhang and Aramyan (2009) and Aramyan et al. 
(2006) and could be mentioned as an example in regard to the conceptual framework and Cao 
and Lumineau (2015) and Kataike and Gellynck (2018) are examples of literature reviews.  
Fourth, many empirical studies on chain governance structures and performance have been 
focusing on individual firms in a supply chain (Srinivasan et al., 2011, Sezen, 2008, Min and 
Mentzer, 2004)  or on the dyads (Birthal et al., 2017, Nyaga et al., 2013, Han et al., 2011, 
Srinivasan et al., 2011) Dyadic level chain analysis collects data from two firms of a dyad, 
the focal company and either an upstream or a downstream firm to the focal company 
(Capaldo and Giannoccaro, 2015, Burkert et al., 2012, Yang et al., 2011, Yang et al., 2010, 
Benton and Maloni, 2005). According to previous research, chain analysis of a supply chain 
at a dyadic level does not bring out the underlying dimensions of the entire chain (Odongo et 
al., 2016, Kühne et al., 2013, Mentzer et al., 2001). Consequently, researchers have an 
increasing interest in evaluating the chain governance structure and performance of triads 
(Molnár et al., 2010, Holma, 2012). However, owing to a rather complicated data collection 
based on triadic approach, there are only few papers applying this approach, especially in the 
agri-food sector. Therefore, to contribute to this field, this research paper attempts to 
investigate the interface between chain governance structures and chain performance in triad 
agri-food chains. 
 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is a theoretical framework and the derived 
research hypotheses. Section 3 details the adopted methodology, Section 4 the analysis and 
presentation of the findings, Section 5 the discussion and interpretation of obtained findings 
and Section 6 discuss the managerial implications. Section 7 provides concluding remarks 
and study limitations to shape the future research agenda.   
 
2. Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
Three theoretical perspectives are suggested through which the concepts chain governance 
structures and chain performance can be viewed. First, transaction cost theory (TCT) predicts 
that the most efficient governance structures are those that minimize production and 
transaction costs considering the institutional environment wherein (Williamson, 2000, 
Ménard and Valceschini, 2005). The institutional environment is where formal and 
informal rules are set in order to reduce uncertainties and transaction costs . This suggests 
that simple governance structures should be used in conjunction with simple contractual 
relations and complex governance structures are reserved for complex relations (Williamson, 
1979, Zhang and Aramyan, 2009). The theory argues that well-established contractual 
governance could be an effective mechanism to control exchange hazards by specifying each 
party’s roles in both stable and changing environments(Cao and Lumineau, 2015).  
Second, resource-based view (RBV) this theory presents a broader understanding of the 
influence of resources on performance (Wernerfelt, 1984, Cabrera‐Suárez et al., 2001, Grant, 
1996, Barney and Clark, 2007). RBV assumes that tangible and intangible resources will 
provide a sustainable competitive advantage when they are valuable to the firm (dairy 
coolers, pasteurizer, need-based training) (Barney et al., 2001). This theory sees resources as 
having a dynamic influence on sustained competitive advantage (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003). 
These authors argue that firms adapt their resources over time to the different stages of their 
capability life cycle.  Rungtusanatham et al. (2003) suggest that the linkages between buyers 
and suppliers are key resources for decisions such as “make or- buy” or integration level in 
the supply chain. 
Third, relational exchange theory (RET) highlights relational norms such as trust, solidarity, 
and cooperation of the chain members’ relationships. Chain partners are expected to behave 
according to the shared relational norms (Heide, 1994, Wathne et al., 2018, Aulakh et al., 
1996, Palmatier et al., 2007). Thus, relational norms are also considered an effective type of 
governance in existing buyer-supplier relationship literature (Zhang and Aramyan, 2009, 
Zhou and Xu, 2012, Xie et al., 2016). In the existing literature on chain governance structures 
and performance, these three main theories are often used concurrently. TCT is traditionally 
used to support the effectiveness of contractual governance, whereas RBV considers 
integration or buy decisions. Finally, the above mentioned three are directly related to 
different forms of chain governance structure to influence performance.  
2.1. Research hypotheses and conceptual model  
Spot market and chain performance  
Market governance with classical contracting for non-specific transactions often happens in 
the spot market where demand and supply are determined by prices (Zhang and Aramyan, 
2009). In spot market arrangements, suppliers are likely to act opportunistically in order to 
realize a short-term profit from the transaction (Gyau and Spiller, 2008). Against this 
background, the chain partners may generally incur some costs as a means of safeguarding 
themselves against the possible opportunistic attitudes and hence transaction costs may 
increase and the overall economic performance may be reduced. Therefore, we hypothesize 
that-; 
 
H1. Spot market transactions are negatively related to chain performance. 
 
Relational governance and chain performance  
Relational governance arises from the presence of trust due to long-time commitment among 
the chain members. Arranz and Arroyabe (2012) noted that relational norms are more 
forceful in improving performance as long-time commitment reduces the time and costs 
associated with recurrent disputes, posturing, and renegotiations. Likewise, Yang et al. (2012) 
observed that relational governance has a positive and significant effect on the channel 
performance of the exporters. As reported by Morgan and Hunt (1994), when both 
commitment and trust are present, they produce outcomes that promote efficiency, 
productivity and effectiveness. Lui et al. (2009) found that relational mechanisms are likely 
to be more effective in improving the performance between companies in a supply chain that 
have a long-term relationship. The following hypothesis is set to be tested: 
 
H2. Relational governance is positively related to chain performance. 
 
Contractual governance and chain performance  
Contractual governance is a legal enforcement in the form of written contracts used to govern 
the transaction whose performance and behavioral standards are specified in the contract 
(Wever et al., 2010). Ferguson et al. (2005) found that contractual governance is positively 
associated with the performance but to a much lesser extent. Performance may be affected 
when detailed contracts are used without a well-developed social relationship (Cannon et al., 
2000).  Contracts are also a way of providing guarantees to companies in the agri-food chains 
and ensuring conformity in the performed actions (Ferguson et al., 2005, Paulin et al., 1997).  
In a current investigation, Dolci et al. (2017) identified a significant and positive relationship 
between contractual governance and chain performance. The following hypothesis will be 
tested: 
 
H3. Contractual governance is positively related to chain performance. 
 
Mini integration and performance  
Mini Integrations (MI) are arrangements coordinated by big processors by means of formal or 
informal agreements with dairy cooperatives. In these transactions, the integrators may 
allocate equipment and technical support in production, depending on the farming stage and 
type of agreement (Martins et al., 2017). MIs are stronger resource control and coordination 
mechanisms associated with hierarchies and power are more effective in dealing with 
difficulties related to the performance of the agri-food chains (Ruzzier, 2009). Firms integrate 
to build entry barriers, facilitate investments in specialized assets, protect product quality, and 
improve scheduling and coordination (Williamson, 1975). We propose the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H4. Mini integration is positively related to chain performance. 
[Insert Figure 1] 
 3. Methodology 
Measurement scale of the questionnaire  
In this paper, endogenous variable chain performance is generally be measured subjectively 
and objectively (Dawes, 1999). An objective way of measuring a performance is based on 
objective data or the financial indicators of enterprises (e.g. profits, inventory, and turnover) 
(Mesic et al., 2018). However, many agri-food companies are often unwilling to release 
information on the financial operations of their company (Collins and Collins, 2001). In this 
regard, Ward et al. (1994) suggested the subjective way of measuring the performance, which 
is based on the respondents’ subjective perception of the chain performance (Covin and 
Slevin, 1989). Previous studies have shown that perceived assessments are consistent with 
objective performance (Molnár et al., 2010, Vickery et al., 2003, Odongo et al., 2016). An 
appropriate measuring instrument is required for the subjective performance measurement, 
which will quantitatively show how successful the agri-food chain is and whether there is a 
potential for improving chain performance (Cohen and Roussel, 2005). The construct chain 
performance was measured by four key indicators illustrated in Table 1. 
 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
In order to operationalize this framework, we ensured transparency and rigor in the research 
process, a survey protocol was adopted to guide the research advocated by  Yin (2013). A set 
of theoretical propositions were derived from the theoretical framework to design the 
questionnaire and guide the data collection process. The key data collection tool was a 
questionnaire administered to the chain members. In a survey, the protocol plays an important 
role in ensuring reliability, providing information so that the research, which is repeated 
under the same conditions, obtains the same results (Yin, 2013). The protocol used in the 
survey was developed in consideration with the chain governance elements and chain 
performance variables mentioned in Tables 1 and 2 below. Thus, the content of the survey 
included questions to understand each of the variables of chain governance structures and 
chain performance, to verify the variables that emerge from literature (Kataike and Gellynck, 
2018). 
[Insert Table 2] 
 Data collection  
Through simple random sampling, a survey was conducted with 345 supply chain members; 
115 first suppliers, 115 second suppliers 115 buyers. The aim of the simple random sample 
was to reduce the potential for human bias in the selection of cases to be included in the 
sample. As a result, the simple random sample provided us with a sample that is highly 
representative of the population being studied.  We obtained a sampling frame from the data 
manager at dairy development authority containing all dairy cooperatives/second suppliers 
forming a population from which a sample was taken. Research participants from the first 
supplying firm included farm owners because they deemed appropriate informants being 
familiar with the daily operations. They also have regular interactions with the senior 
managers of the second supplying firm. We began our data collection with the complete list 
of all second suppliers working for the first supplier and the buyer. The second supplier 
provided responses to measurement items pertaining to buyer and the first supplier. In the 
context of this study, supplier-initiated triads have their origin in a decision by the supplier to 
use a third party to mediate and/or support the exchange with the customer/buyer. For 
instance, dairy farmers decide to work with primary cooperatives in direct contact with the 
processors. (Wynstra et al., 2015, Mena et al., 2013). 
 
Data analysis  
First, from the qualitative information presented in Tables 1 and 2, a quantitative 
questionnaire was designed and pre-tested (Malhotra and Birks, 2007). Second, reflective 
indicators were analyzed to generate reliability and exploratory convergent factor analysis 
was applied to refine the preliminary questionnaire with Varimax orthogonal rotation method 
(Hair et al., 2014). The ratings from the alpha of constructs and the instrument were over 0.6, 
which is considered satisfactory for investigatory research (Hair et al., 2006). Factor loadings 
below 0.5 were discarded, as recommended by Gratz and Roemer (2004). Thus, the construct 
contractual governance items CGS2 and CGS4 were eliminated, equally for spot market and 
mini integration, 2 items were deleted for each as indicated in Table 2. Therefore, the original 
26 items turned out to be 19, since 7 items were deleted during model specification as 
illustrated in the measurement model Figure 2. The Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin sample adequacy 
tests and Bartlett’s test of sphericity provided acceptable ratings of 0.825 with a significance 
level of 0.00, respectively. This suggests that important correlations exist between items. 
 Third, confirmatory factor analysis based on SEM was analyzed. A sample size close to 200 
respondents is enough to use SEM, and the model’s stability would be really doubtful when 
the ratio between the number of subjects and parameters is less than 5:1, according to Kline 
(1998). Therefore, the pooled sample for the proposed measurement model with 47 
parameters was estimated and 460 cases were satisfactory to assess model fit through a 
specific measurement model software for SEM (AMOS 22), thus, defined the measurement 
model with the constructs and respective items. Convergent validity is the next step, which 
means the observation of the ratings and the standardized factor values. To evaluate the 
adequacy of the ratings and unidimensionality, standardized residual covariance and 
modification indexes were analyzed.  
 
Fourth, discriminant validity, the relationship between the average variance extracted (AVE) 
and the square of the correlation between the factors was computed. All values were 
according to those recommended by Hair Jr et al. (2017). Finally, construct reliability the 
AVE and the composite reliability of each construct was calculated. All values were over 0.5 
for the AVE and over 0.7 for composite reliability, showing the measurement model to be 
reliable. Also, the adjustment indexes were calculated, based upon the revised measurement 
model. All values were considered acceptable. We can observe the final measurement model 
with the indexes in Figure 2 and Table 3 respectively. 
 
4. Results  
According to the research methodology set, the main research findings are presented in five 
sections: (1) reliability and validity scores of the questionnaire are presented in Table 3.  The 
measurement model for the total sample is presented as Figure 2 and a full SEM for total 
sample demonstrated in Figure 3, the model fit indices for each subsample is presented in 
Table 4, the path coefficients for testing the hypotheses are presented in Table 5 of each 
sample. Finally, the structural models related to the hypothesis are appended.  
[Insert Table 3] 
[Insert Figure 2] 
[Insert Figure 3] 
Based on the satisfactory CFA result for the measurement model, a full SEM was run first for 
the total sample (Model 1) and then for the four subgroups of chain members. The tested 
Model 1 summarizes the chain governance structures and their relationships on chain 
performance as shown in Figure 3. In general, this model performed well as indicated by the 
goodness-of-fit indices Chi-square/ df = 2.387, CFI = 0.947, RMSEA = 0.051, GFI=0.900, 
NFI =0.936, IFI=0.948, and AGFI= 0.901. The standardized estimates for Model 1 indicated 
that relational governance and mini integration positively influence chain performance. With 
regard to the spot market, there is a significant negative impact on chain performance. 
Remarkable was the insignificant relationship between contractual governance and chain 
performance. The coefficients were too small, suggesting that formal contracts do not predict 
the dairy chain performance. It is possibly due to weak legal enforcement for such a 
perishable product (milk).  
For the subgroups, the significant and strong relationship between different path estimates 
were observed. This kind of modeling allows the simultaneous estimation of a series of 
distinct multiple equations, which are related to each other based on the used theory and 
theoretical references. The summary of all fit indexes and path coefficients of the structural 
models is presented in Tables 4 and 5. It is worth mentioning that in the subgroups structural 
models, we used reflective models because, according to Hair et al. (2006), measures are 
expected to be correlated with internal consistency reliability. In this case, dropping an 
indicator from the model does not alter the meaning of the construct and it takes 
measurement error into account at the item level (Jarvis et al., 2003). 
[Insert Table 4] 
[insert table 5] 
 
5. Discussion 
The paper provides several important findings for the relationship between chain governance 
structures and chain performance for the Ugandan dairy sector. Empirical evidence show that 
H1 was partially supported. First suppliers and Second suppliers at their downstream 
observed a significant and positive influence of spot market on chain performance. The result 
builds on the findings of Gyau and Spiller (2008), who observed a positive correlation 
between the spot market and performance (i.e. cost reduction, financial success, and 
satisfaction). On the contrary, buyers observed an insignificant and negative link between 
spot market and chain performance. This finding is in accordance with previous research 
(Han et al., 2011, Wever et al., 2010). It can be attributed to the fact that spot market dairy 
suppliers often act opportunistically in order to realize short-term profits. This result is 
expected because Ugandan dairy processors (buyer) prefer more coordinated chain 
governance structures with their suppliers (Trienekens et al., 2018, Gyau and Spiller, 2008, 
Williamson, 1991, Hobbs and Young, 2000). 
The interaction between relational governance and chain performance (H2) predicted a 
significant and positive effect for all models. Chain members with a long-term relationship 
and trust are identified as being able to achieve better performances (Dolci et al., 2017). This 
result is expected as previous research in the agribusiness sector has shown that trust is a 
critical determinant of a good performing relationship (Mesic et al., 2018, Molnár et al., 
2010, Odongo et al., 2016, Koopmans et al., 2017). According to Wacker et al. (2016), 
relational governance displays positive influence on performance. Furthermore, Sezen and 
Yilmaz (2007) report that chain members build their relationships based on mutual trust 
because exchange relationships with high level of trust and commitment provide each chain 
actor more benefits and profits than it can be obtained in a non-trust governance mechanism.  
The results of this study partially observe a positive and significant influence of contractual 
governance and chain performance, which partially supports H3 downstream suppliers). The 
finding is in agreement with Dolci et al. (2017), who argue that the control of activities is 
essential for achieving performance that faces changes over time. The control of processes in 
the dairy value chain is crucial for improving performance (Dolci et al., 2017). Formal 
contracts are used by cooperative managers as mechanisms that attempt to mitigate risk and 
uncertainty in exchange relationships (Lusch and Brown, 1996). A clear contract ensures that 
transaction terms and conditions are effectively enforceable (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992). 
When conflicts arise among chain partners, solutions are provided through a contract which is 
lawful.  
 
On the other hand, we observed an insignificant path for the first suppliers and second 
suppliers in estimating the influence of contractual governance on chain performance. This 
finding is in agreement with Schulze et al. (2007) who observed an insignificant link between 
contractual governance and performance in a German pork supply chain. Although contracts 
provide effective safeguards for the chain partners to protect themselves from the chain 
partner’s opportunism, they are also expensive to implement effectively (Macneil, 1977, 
Williamson, 1985). Therefore, incomplete contracts which consist of moral hazards, 
information hold-up, and opportunism significantly increase transaction costs (Huang et al., 
2014). The insignificance of contractual governance is likely due to the fact that the dairy 
farmers are not convinced of the benefits of the formal exchange arrangements. Birthal et al. 
(2017) also observed that formal structure suffers from low compliance rates probably due to 
weak legal institutions and enforcement mechanisms.  
The findings provide partial support for H4. It is observed that mini integration influences 
chain performance, which improves efficiency, responsiveness, quality and flexibility for the 
downstream buyers and the upstream second suppliers. In Uganda, mini integrated 
transactions are arrangements coordinated by dairy processors mostly by means of informal 
or formal agreements with the second suppliers. In these transactions, the integrator allocates 
production equipment, such as milk coolers, milk tanks for transportation, and provide 
technical support in production, depending on the type of agreement with the chain partner. 
This is especially important for the dairy sector where small-scale producers are dominant. 
Therefore, the majority of processors depend on mini integration with second suppliers. 
Similarly, our findings are in line with the results of Zhou et al. (2015), who found that 
collaborative and integrated activities minimize opportunism within the chain partners.  
 
On the other hand, the first suppliers perceived a negative and significant link between mini 
integration and chain performance, whereas for the second suppliers it is insignificant. This 
indicates that chain members do not receive sufficient technical support or mutual benefit and 
their join decisions are not considered by the downstream chain members. Previous studies 
have found that the same degree of integration can have a different impact on the firm 
performance depending on whether the share distribution of the leading ﬁrms reﬂects clear 
leadership or similar market share positions (Ruzzier, 2009). This should be a point of 
improvement in the future because stronger resource control and coordination mechanisms 
associated with hierarchies are more effective in dealing with difficulties related to the 
performance of the agri-food chains (Trifković, 2016). 
 
6. Managerial implications  
The reported findings have relevant implications for policymakers and managers. According 
to the findings, chain members can use the result of the study to take certain measures which 
improve the performance of the chains they are affiliated to. It was observed that relational 
governance performs better; therefore, strengthening and maintaining long-term relationships 
is very important for chain partners. It is also necessary to establish trust and commitment 
within the chain relationships. Collaborative actions and the presence of trust within the chain 
partners are key aspects to create integration and, in the end, lead to gains for all the parties 
involved. Furthermore, the establishment of a good reputation based on trust can be achieved 
by greater concern for the economic satisfaction of the chain partners (Mesic et al., 2018). 
 
When contracts are not overly applied due to other legal and institutional constraints, the 
downstream chain managers face challenges to reduce the complexity of transactions along 
the chain. Therefore, the policymakers must develop formal control infrastructure to help 
buyers and suppliers solidify the chain members’ collective interests, which can reduce 
opportunism and the conflicts of individual members. Although suppliers and buyers use 
relational governance to improve chain performance with their chain partners. The Ugandan 
dairy actors should also use formal contracts to improve transaction within the dairy sector. 
The alignment of both chain governance structures is more effective than the use of only one. 
All chain members, especially the downstream suppliers and buyers, should commit to 
exercising the optimal combination of both governance mechanisms (Huang et al., 2014). As 
pointed out by Liu et al. (2009), managers should combine different elements of chain 
governance to improve chain performance. A similar case is seen in Toyota's supplier system 
in Japan (Dyer and Chu (2003). The appropriate usage of formal contracts exerts a significant 
influence indeed to improve chain performance. However, the usage of formal control should 
be carefully evaluated and flexibly used to avoid strict contract regulations and monitoring 
ex-post costs. Furthermore, adaptable formal control activities that can concurrently 
contribute to fostering social control should be listed in the chain management principles 
(Huang et al., 2014). 
 
7. Limitations of the study and final remarks 
Besides, the conceptual contribution of this paper, the main strength of this study pertains to 
its large triad sample, including three chain members at different chain levels. The focus on 
chain level analysis and data collection from minimum three firms of chains as opposed to 
dyadic chain level contributes to the limited number of triadic studies (Mesic et al., 2018, 
Molnár et al., 2010, Odongo et al., 2016). This study investigated 115 triads and 
benchmarked chain performance within the dairy sector, and compared 460 chain members’ 
perceptions. The data were collected from a single country, more specifically, the study was 
conducted in Uganda, thereby filling the gap of limited research attention in developing 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. More so, the empirical contribution of this study also lies in 
the choice of the food sector. The dairy sector has also received very little attention in 
scientific literature. Consequently, there was a need to extend the focus of the dairy industry 
to downstream and upstream chain members to increase awareness on both the individual and 
chain competitiveness and performance.  
 
Despite the paper contributions, some limitations are worthy be acknowledged, which open 
up opportunities for further research. First, our findings are based on a single survey 
collecting quantitative data, and the result can only testify to the situations of three subgroups 
with different forms of governance structures and performance; it does not study multiple 
chains. A multiple chain analysis research design should be considered for future studies to 
clearly draw out the relationship between chain governance structures and chain performance 
across several food sectors. Secondly, another limitation of this research is the fact that the 
sample is located in only one country (Uganda), which reduces the potential generalization of 
the results. Future research can consider multiple countries with the same context. Thirdly, 
although this research contributes by providing additional confirmation of the relationships 
between chain governance structures and chain performance, control variables, such as the 
length of relationship, income, level of education and production units were not analyzed to 
measure causality between CGS and CP from different perspectives. As for a further 
research, we would recommend studies to analyze the phenomenon to estimate the 
moderating effect of control variables. 
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